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a  b s t  r a c  t
Problems regarding  the  change  of auditor  and the  opinion issued  by  the  auditor  through the  financial
audit  report have  been  shown to be  an  important issue.
The objective  of this  study  is to  examine to  what extent  the  change  of auditor is  related  to the type  of
opinion that  the  auditor  expressed in the  audit  report.
In  pursuit  of this  objective,  an  empirical study  was  carried  out  supported  by  a sample from  a set of
entities with securities  admitted  to  trading on the  Portuguese  stock  market  in the  period between 2006
and  2012 (seven  years) and  using logistic regression  to test  whether  the  reception of the  qualified  audit
report indicated  the  change  of auditor.
The findings point to there  being  a significant positive relationship  between the  qualified  audit  report
and a change  of  auditor,  verifiable for  qualified  opinions  on assets and  others, but  not to the  qualified
opinions on  equity  and liabilities.
The  largest  number  of qualified  opinions  occur in the  years  2007,  2009 and 2011,  most  of which  were
related  to equity  and assets, and the  change  of auditor  is  more  associated  with  qualified  opinions  on
assets  and  other  qualified  opinions than  the  qualified  opinions  on equity and  liabilities.
© 2015  ASEPUC. Published  by  Elsevier Espan˜a,  S.L.U. This  is an open access article under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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r  e  s  u m  e  n
Los problemas  existentes relativos  al cambio  de  auditor  y a  la opinión emitida  por el  auditor  a través  del
informe de  la  auditoría financiera  está probado  que  se trata  de  un tema de  gran  interés.
El  objetivo de  esta investigación es examinar  hasta  que  punto el  cambio  de  auditor  está relacionado
con el tipo  de  opinión que  el auditor  expresa en el  informe  de  la  auditoría.
En la  consecución de  este  objetivo  se llevó a cabo  un estudio  empírico apoyado  en una  muestra,  un  con-
junto  de  entidades  con  valores  admitidos  a negociación  en  el  mercado  de  valores  portugués,  en  el período
comprendido  entre 2006 y  2012  (siete  an˜os)  mediante  regresión logística utilizada  para comprobar  si la
recepción del informe  de  auditoría  financiera  lleva al cambio  de  auditor.
Los resultados  apuntan  a la existencia de  una  relación  positiva significativa  entre  el informe  de  auditoría
y  el cambio de auditor,  verificable  por  las reservas de  activos  y otros, pero no a las  reservas de  los fondos
propios  y  prestados.
El  mayor  número  de  reservas se  produce  en  los  an˜os  2007, 2009 y  2011, la mayor  parte  de  las reservas
naturales  se relaciona  con la  equidad  y  activos,  y  el  cambio  de  auditor  está más  asociado  con  las reservas
de  activos  y otras reservas  que con  las reservas  de  los fondos  propios  y ajenos.
© 2015 ASEPUC. Publicado  por Elsevier  Espan˜a, S.L.U. Este  es un artı´culo  Open Access  bajo  la CC
BY-NC-ND  licencia (http://creativecommons.org/licencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Introduction
The audit report issues the auditor’s opinion on the financial
demonstrations of the enterprise, such that it becomes of  huge
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2015.05.001
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importance, both for the users of the financial information and for
the administration of the enterprise.
However, the users of the financial information often misun-
derstand that the auditor’s opinion is  too technical and concise and
the administration of the enterprises may  be tempted to  relate the
auditor’s continuity with his/her opinion.
The research undertaken studies the relationship between the
kind of opinion issued by  the auditor in  his/her annual report and
the change of auditor, in terms of his/her continuity, from a  sample
of entities with values admitted to trade in the Portuguese stock
market, in the period between 2006 and 2012, and used logistic
regression to test whether the reception of the audit report from
four types of qualified opinions indicated the change of auditor.
The article is structured in four parts: the first one discloses
the audit’s theoretical context in terms of the report and the audi-
tor’s opinion and the second one reviews the factors that explain
the change of the auditor, the third develops the empirical study
in terms of sampling and variables, and the fourth and last part
discusses the results.
In the current economical and social context of our  society this
article aims to enhance the scientific contribute on the issue of the
change of auditor, which has given rise to so much controversy from
the researchers and authors in the science community.
This research advantageously enhances the nature and the
potential impact of the information provided by  the auditor to any-
one interested in the entities and allows stakeholders to  question
the administration on the information reliability and the current
auditor’s trust.
Audit’s theoretical framework
The audit report
The audit report is the document where the auditor issues
his/her opinion on the financial demonstrations of the enterprise
audited, such that this opinion is  regarded by  society as having a
public character. The audit report is often regarded as a  “barometer”
for the enterprise’s financial situation and not  only as a  document
that reveals reliability on the financial demonstrations (Arens and
Loebbecke, 1996), such that the audit report is  the climax of the
audit process through which the auditor issues his/her opinion on
the audited financial demonstrations or the reasons not to  issue
them.
Under that line of thought, Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and
Subramanyam (1998) state that the audit reduces the existing
information differences among the managers and the remaining
people interested on the enterprise, since the users of such infor-
mation gain access to  reliable financial demonstrations through the
certification conveyed by the auditor.
Thus, the message issued by the auditor must be perfectly
understood and its function clearly defined, that is, “the issuer task is
to fight for a simple, clear, interesting and interactive message, in such
a way that it conveys at least the main points to the public target”
(Kotler, 1996).
To Pasiouras, Gaganis, and Zopounidis (2007) the audit report
consists of a report where the auditor issues an opinion regarding
the financial demonstrations of the audited enterprise, enhancing
whether they are free from relevant distortions and whether they
were developed according to  the specific current legislation and
follow the accounting norms and principles.
Also to Hope and Langli (2010),  the audit report is an instru-
ment of communication, wherein the related parts are  informed
on the conclusions provided by  the auditor, as well as on the
possible problems found in the internal controls and/or the
financial demonstrations of the enterprises audited, including
those regarding the enterprise ability to  continue.
The justified theories of the audit in  the present society must be
framed in the financial information area since the audit report and
its publishing are a  reliability element added to  that information.
Finding an adequate theory to explain its existence is, in the
opinion of Almeida and Silva (2013) an academic and intellectual
challenge, wherein the agency’s theory is  the one which is more
inclusive and unifying of the various justifying theories.
The agency’s theory comes from the separation between prop-
erty and entities management, which has given rise to differences
in  the information and agency conflicts among owners and man-
agers, thus strengthening the auditor’s role for its reliability and
credibility provided to the society since it forms an instrument of
screening and reduction of the agency’s conflict.
This way, by being part of the social control process (Lee, 1996)
or of the responsibility of providing the accounts Flint, 1988)  the
audit is  justified on the basis of the agency’s theory, which is
regarded to a  certain extent as a cover for the risk of information
(Porter, Simon, & Hatherly, 2008).
In the same line, Almeida and Silva stated that  “the auditor may
be seen as  a  referee who defines the consistency of the financial demon-
strations developed by the agent, taking as  a pattern the rules of
accounting (. . .) and as such the auditor is regarded as an agent who
verifies the actions of another in a  context of minimization of the main
cost” (p. 48).
Nonetheless, it is also important to  refer that the auditory is
related to the theory of signalling (disclosure and transparency
regarding the market signals the entity and may reduce the financ-
ing costs), to  the decision taking theory (as it allows for the
assessment of the information value to potentiate better decisions,
according to Saada, 2000), to the theory of the government of  soci-
eties (according to  Power (1997) as it is an inclusive part of the
architecture of control imposed by internal or external motives),
the theory of insurance (according to Cosserat and Rodda (2009) the
insolvency is sought to be associated with an audit’s flaw, supported
by the assumption that the release of fraud financial information is
also the auditor’s responsibility).
The relevance and understanding of the audit report
Authors such as Siqueira (2004),  Boynton, Johnson, and Kell
(2002),  Wiesner (1987),  Ricchiute (2002) and Cabal Garcia (2001)
and national and international organizations such as the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW), the Compag-
nie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC), the Ordem dos
Revisores Oficiais de  Contas (OROC), the Instituto de Contabilidad y
Auditoría de  Cuentas (ICAC), the International Federation of Accoun-
tants (IFAC) and the European Federation of Accountants have been
concerned about the clarification of the audit report’s main causes
for not being fully understood. The main reasons for the report’s
lack of understanding are as follows:
• Standardized report: as the structure of the report is  according
to  the norms, regardless of the activity sector it is applied to,
it becomes more a  symbolic document than a  communication
between the auditor and the user, which leads to  the users not
reading the audit reports.
• Technical language: the commission for the auditor’s respon-
sibilities (Cohen Commission) enhances the use of  a highly
standardized language which results in  an ambiguity for most
of the users who  often lack the accountant or audit skills.
The users are not familiar with the terminology used in  the
reports and that is why they find it difficult to understand the
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message transmitted. If the aim of the audit report is to  give
credibility to the financial demonstrations issued by an enterprise
it  becomes crucial that its users understand it.
Thus, García and Martínez (2001) have realized that on the one
hand the excessive use of technical terms in  the audit report and
on the other hand the report’s content being too concise make it
difficult to understand. Gay and Schelluch (2006),  in their research
on this issue, enhance the uncertainty in  the understanding of the
audit report from most of the stakeholders.
• The responsibility of the audit report is  not clarified. Ruíz
Barbadillo (1998) believes that despite the research carried out in
the previous decades, the audit report still does not allow its users
to understand its nature and the asset that is  the information
conveyed in it.
That idea is shared by  López Combarros (1996) when he defends
that “regarding these areas it is necessary to communicate to the users
of the financial demonstrations the exact range of the work we hope
to perform and the level of responsibility we take on.”
In a research performed by  Schelluch and Gay (2006),  the con-
clusions were that  the auditors believe to have higher levels of
responsibility and accountability than that which is  actually con-
ferred to them by  the users of the financial information. The
shareholders skeptical attitude probably comes from the recent
financial scandals in the enterprises.
Explaining factors of the  change of auditor
The auditor is  responsible for alerting the administration about
the weaknesses, uncertainties or irregularities found, which are
often materially relevant and must therefore be mentioned in the
auditor’s report, and which give rise to a qualified auditor’s report,
and as such the qualified auditor’s report may  have particular con-
sequences: the enterprise’s administration may  “press” the auditor
to issue an unqualified audit report, as the value of the shares as well
as the administration fees may  be  affected (Chow & Rice, 1982).
The administration will try to  eliminate the possibility of the
auditor of issuing qualified auditor’s reports as those reports may
have a negative impact on the perception of the stakeholders over
the administration in general and the enterprise in particular.
The enterprise scandal that involved Enron and the associated
audit enterprise, Arthur Andersen, has started the discussion on
the auditor’s independency through the process of auditing, since
the hiring period of the auditor is of about 10 years. Thus, when the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was  being implemented there was  a  suggestion
of implementing the requirement of change of auditor in  the USA,
which never really happened (Defond & Francis, 2005).
However, the change of auditor has been implemented in India,
Australia, Singapore, South Chorea, Hong Kong, among others. In
Portugal, the CMVM has implemented the change of auditors for
the enterprises with open capital.
The literature about the qualified audit reports and the change
of auditor is linked. The most advocated variables to justify the
auditor’s opinion in the report include, amongst others:
• Audit’s enterprise fees (Addams & Davis, 1994; McKeown,
Mutchler, & Hopwood, 1991);
• Financial issues (Carpenter &  Strawser, 1971; Haskins and
Willams, 1990);
• Change of Administration (Burton &  Roberts, 1967; Carpenter &
Strawser, 1971);
• Enterprise size (Chow & Rice, 1982; Shank & Murdock, 1978;
Warren, 1980).
For the last few decades several empirical researches have been
carried out both  in Europe and in the United States of America,
highlighting a set of variables related to the change of auditor,
namely financial issues, entity size and administration or  change
of financial manager.
From the set of researches performed, the Smith’s (1986) per-
formed in the USA show that only 4% of the change of auditor comes
from the issuing of a  qualified opinion.
Worth referring to is another research performed in the USA by
Davidson, Jiraporn and DaDalt (2004) on  the potential reasons for
the change of the auditor, which are based on situations in  which
the managers look for an audit of an inferior rank with costs for the
agency, that is,  signalling the existence of issues on the quality of
the financial auditory.
Also, in  Europe, namely in  the United Kingdom, a  research
has been performed by Hudaib and Cooke (2005), wherein it was
realized that the entities with more financial issues and where
there is  the change of the financial manager are more inclined
to get a  qualified opinion from the auditor and that the like-
lihood of the change of auditor rises with the gravity of  the
opinion.
The worldwide literature has performed various researches
related to the reasons that cause the enterprises to change the
auditor as stated above and which are centred on two approaches.
One is  the market approach in which the change of  auditor
is analyzed according to the nature of the audit demand that
the enterprises carry out and the supply performed by  the audit
professionals. The change of auditor is  related to the changes in
the economic-financial and corporative features of the enterprises
(Firth, 1999; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Johnson & Lys, 1990; Palmrose,
1986).
The other approach is  contractual, which focuses on the per-
ception of the audit as a  contract in which the enterprise freely
appoints the auditor and where the possibility of a  disagreement
between the auditor and the enterprise may  lead to a decision from
the enterprise to change the auditor (Francis & Krishnan, 1999;
Lennox, 2000).
Summing up, we can conclude that there is  a  difference concern-
ing the impact of the audit report and the change of the auditor. If,
on the one hand some authors point out the change as a  result of
the clients search for auditors who  issue a clear opinion, on the
other hand, organizations such as SEC (2000) and authors such as
Petty and Cuganesan (1996) defend the need to impose measures
of mandatory rotation of the auditors, arguing that long contracts
reduce the auditors motivation to keep an independent relation-
ship with the clients.
Empirical research
Population and sampling
The population target consists of the entities issuing security
values admitted to  trade in a  continuous market in the Portuguese
stock market, and the sampling is  based on the above mentioned
entities that have provided their financial demonstrations on the
internet site of the “Comissão do Mercado de  Valores Mobiliários”
(CMVM) during the month of July 2013, corresponding to  the period
between 2006 and 2012 (for seven years).
Hence it came that the population consisted of 120 entities, of
which 37 were cut (as they did not present any kind of economic-
financial information, both on the internet site of the CMVM and
their own internet site) and 26 (for being financial entities, there-
fore their financial demonstrations disclosed a  specific framework
not comparable to the other entities), wherein the sample consists
of 57 entities, which represent about 69% of the total entities.
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Table  1
Description of the variables: Dependent and independent.
 (Yn) Change of Auditor Dicotomic dependent variable that takes on  the value 1  if the
enterprise changes the auditor in the  year N and the value 0  does not
change
This  way  the variable considered in the model reflects the type of
opinion issued by the auditor in a particular exercise
Dependent variable
QualifEq Qualified opinion on their Equity from
N-1  to  N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if  the enterprise has at
least one Reservation as their Own Capital and the  value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 1
QualifLib Qualified opinion on their Liabilities
from N-1 to N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if  the enterprise has at
least other Reservations as Borrowed and the value 0  otherwise
Independent variable 2
QualifAs Qualified opinion on their Assets from
N-1 to  N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if  the enterprise has at
least one Reservation as Assets and the  value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 3
OtherQualif Other Qualified opinion from N-1 to
N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if  the enterprise has at
least one Reservation as Other Reservations and the value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 4
Source: The authors.
These 57 entities were analyzed in  a  consistent manner through-
out the research period even if at some times they were not
included in the list of issuing entities, according to the CMVM
and, altogether a set of 337 observations were achieved during the
research period of time.
Description of the research and variables
In order to analyze to what extent the change of auditors can be
explained by the auditor’s report itself, we have graded the auditor’s
reports in a period of seven years, that is, without qualified opinions
and ranked, as this leads to  a  more consistent picture as well as a
more objective reality (Cho and Trent, 2006).
Thus, Patton (2002) has adopted an identical procedure of expla-
nation, as it contributes to  the validity and reliability, building a
more faithful picture of the phenomenon through convergence.
We have adopted the statistical technique of logistic regression,
just as McFadden (1973),  Ismail, Ali Ahmed, Md  Nassir, and Abdul
Hamid (2008) and Heliodoro and Paula (2014) have defended and
used to analyze the relationship between the dependent variable 
(Yn)  – change of auditor (which takes on the value of 1. When there
is a change of auditor and the value 0 (zero) in  the opposite situ-
ation) – and four independent variables, estimated by the method
of maximum similitude, which are:
• Qualified opinion on equity;
• Qualified opinion on liabilities;
• Qualified opinion on the asset;
• Other qualified opinions not mentioned in  the ones described
above.
Table 1 enhances the variables which were the object of
research, that is, the dependent variable as well as the four inde-
pendent variables.
The selection of independent variables allows for the realization
of to what extent the entities in the sampling have changed their
auditors, for having received a  qualified opinion, which is consid-
ered as relevant and the object of international acknowledgement
by the scientific community, by Ball, Walker, and Whittre (1979),
Ballesta and García-Meca (2005), Brío González (1998), Gómez-
Aguillar and Ruiz Barbadillo (2000, 2003) and Senteney, Chen, and
Ashok (2006).
Logistic regression is a  statistical technique that aims at pro-
ducing, from a set of observations, a  model that allows for the
prediction of values on the basis of one or more variables ranked as
independent variables and considered binary.
The research was based on the reports and accounts and on the
audit of the different entities that were the object of the research
in order to identify the typology of the auditor and his/her stay in
the entity through time, as well as the number and type of qualified
opinions, wherein the Statistical Package for the Science Social (SPSS),
version 21, was used for the needed statistical analysis.
Results analysis
The assessment of the results achieved consists of a  descriptive
analysis of the constant qualified opinion of the audit report and
the logistic regression.
Regarding the type of qualified opinions the following points
have been found:
• In terms of time the rise in  the number of qualified opinions
between 2006 and 2007 – 305 qualified opinions were reported
in this period, which represent an average of 43.57 qualified opin-
ions every year, wherein the number of qualified opinions shifted
between a  minimum of 33 (in 2012) and a  maximum of 51  (in
2007), as can be seen in  Fig. 1. It should be  highlighted that there is
a  higher number of qualified opinions in  years of legislative elec-
tions (2009 and 2011) and that, at the same time, there is a  lower
number of qualified opinions in the year before the legislative
elections (2008 and 2010), except for the year 2012.
• In terms of the type of qualified opinions it is clear that  the higher
number of qualified opinions concerns equity (106, about 35%),
followed by the qualified opinions on  the asset (70, approxi-
mately 23%), the other qualified opinions (68, which represent
22%) and, finally, the qualified opinions concerning the liabilities
(61, about 20%).
• If we  consider the type of qualified opinions it becomes clear that
the highest number of qualified opinions concerns equity and
other qualified opinions and that the lowest number concerns
the qualified opinions on liabilities, as can be  seen in Table 2.
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Fig. 1. Rise in the number of Qualified Opinion between 2006 and 2012.
Source: The authors.
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Table  2
Entities with a higher number of qualified opinion, by type.
Total of qualifications Qualification on  equity Qualification on liabilities Qualification on asset Other qualification
Compta 7 7 0 0  0
CP  16 7 1 6  2
EDIA  14 2 1 6  5
Estoril Sol 17 1 6 1  3
FCP  18 7 3 1  7
Real  Estate Grão-Pará 13 1 4 2  6
Lisgráfica 20 5 2 6  7
Parque Expo 98 25 6 7 7  5
REFER 26 7 7 6  6
SCP  14 7 2 2  3
SLB  17 7 5 1  4
STCP 18 7 1 4  6
Source: The authors.
Table 3
Independent variables.
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp. (B) 95% CI  to  Exp (B)
Less than Superior to
1◦ Step QualifEq .301 .412 .534 1 .465 1.351 .603 3.028
QualifLib −.182 .422 .185 1 .667 .834 .365 1.907
QualifAs 1.062 .409 6.727 1 .009 2.891 1.296 6.450
OtherQualif −.752 .426 3.113 1 .078 .471 .204 1.087
Source: The authors.
We  have found that the highest number of qualified opinions (7)
refers to equity (covering eight entities), followed by  qualified opin-
ions on asset and other qualified opinions (four entities each) and,
lastly, the qualified opinions on liabilities (seven) in two of the types
identified, which is the case of Refer (qualified opinions on equity
and liabilities), FCP (qualified opinions on equity and other qualified
opinions) and Parque Expo 98 (qualified opinions on liabilities).
Concerning the result of logistic regression, a level of signifi-
cance has been defined (˛) of 0.1 as it is an acceptable probability
Newbold, 1997)  and when the coefficient of the variables present a
p-value lower than the level of significance defined (p-value >  ˛),
then there is an influence of this independent variable, hence
Table 3.
Bearing in mind the results of the Wald test, shown in Table 3,
we have concluded that the independent variables disclose two
different behaviours:
• Inductor to the change of the auditor from the independent vari-
able 3 – Qualified opinions on the Asset from N-1 to  N-3 (QualifAs)
and the independent variable 4 – Other qualified opinions from
N-1 to N-3 (OtherQualif) – for disclosing a  p-value lower than the
level of significance defined (  ˛ =  0.1), thus affecting the depen-
dent variable – the change of auditor – that is, the existence
of  these two types of qualified opinions in the audit report is
an important factor to allow for a change of the auditor by the
enterprise audited.
• Non-inductor to  the change of the auditor from the independent
variable 1 – Qualified opinions on Equity from N-1 to  N-3 (Qual-
ifEq) – and the independent variable 2 – Qualified opinion on
Liabilities from N-1 to N-3 (QualifLib) – for disclosing a  p-value
higher than the level of significance defined (˛  =  0.1), not affecting
the dependent variable – the change of the auditor – that is, the
existence of these two types of qualified opinions is not  a  decisive
factor to replace the auditor.
Conclusion
Different authors defend that there are many factors that
influence the change of the auditor, wherein there are different
approaches that try to explain them, namely the contractual
approach and the traditional one.
The audit reports of the entities that issue securities admitted to
trade in a  continuous market in  the Portuguese stock market and
that consist of our sample in  the period between 2006 and 2012
enhance 305 qualified opinions that:
• Refer to an annual average of 43.57 qualified opinions.
• Most of the qualified opinions (58%) are relative both to equity
(with 35%) and to  asset (with 23%).
Referring mostly to entities with public capital (with about 55%),
followed at a  great distance the sportive anonymous societies (with
27%) and the entities with private capital (with the remaining 18%).
The change of the auditor (dependent variable) is influenced by
the situation of several types of qualified opinions (independent
variables) as the following has been found:
• The non-existence of qualified opinions has led to the keeping of
the auditor in about 66% of the cases.
• The finding of one to seven qualified opinions led to, on the one
hand, a  change of the auditor (in about 50% of the cases) and,
on the other hand, to two changes of the auditor (in 33% of the
situations).
• The qualified opinions on the asset and others are decisive to
the change of the auditor, according to the result of the logistic
regression carried out.
• The qualified opinions on equity and liabilities do  not  contribute
to the change of the auditor, as a  consequence of the logistic
regression carried out.
The change of the auditor may  be a consequence of an inten-
tional behaviour carried out by the entity in order to avoid the
adverse image before the users of the accounting financial infor-
mation of the financial audit report, that is, the entities that can
change the auditor do it in an intentional way so as to  prevent a
negative image from the stockholders.
The existence of qualified opinions on the asset and others in the
audit reports are the most relevant and the ones that contribute to
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the change of the auditor as the entities seek to save the “value of
the active”, which adds up  to  the stakeholders satisfaction.
The conclusions of the research are limited to  the number of
entities in the sample and to the period of time analyzed. If the
period of time were longer and the sample size were larger, then
the results could eventually be more consistent.
In spite of the above mentioned limitations the research under-
taken has contributed for a better understanding of the existing
relationship between the type of opinion issued by the auditor
through the audit report and the change of the auditor.
Conflict of interests
The authors declare no  conflict of interest.
References
Addams, H. L., & Davis, B. (1994). Why  the fastest growing companies in Amer-
ica  hired and fired their auditors. Privately held companies report reasons for
selecting and switching auditors. CPA  Journal,  64(August), 38–41.
Almeida, B., & Silva, A. (2013). Integrac¸ ão das teorias explicativas da auditoria no
modelo de accountability deLaughlin: análise teórica e  empírica. Revista de Con-
tabilidade e Gestão, 14, 43–92.
Arens, A., & Loebbecke, J. (1996). Auditing an integrated approach (6th ed.). Prentice
Hall  Inc.
Ball, R., Walker, R., & Whittre, G. (1979). Audit qualification and share prices. Abacus,
15(July), 23–34.
Ballesta, J. P. S., & García-Meca, E. (2005). Audit qualifications and corporate gover-
nance  in Spanish listed firms. Managerial Auditing Journal,  20(7), 725–738.
Becker, L., Defond, M.,  Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. (1998). The effect of audit
quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15, 1–24.
Boynton, W. C., Johnson, R. N., &  Kell, W. G. (2002). Modern auditing (7th ed.). São
Paulo: Atlas.
Brío González, E. B.  (1998). Efecto de las Salvedades de los Informes de Audito-
ria sobre el Precio de las Acciones en la Bolsa de Madrid. Revista Espan˜ola de
Financiación y Contabilidade, XXVII(enero-marzo (94)), 129–170.
Burton, J. C., & Roberts, W.  (1967). A study of auditor changes. Journal of Accountancy,
31–36.
Cabal Garcia, E. (2001). Informes de auditoria. Partida Doble, 119, 20–33. ISSN: 0213-
6929.
Carpenter, C. G., & Strawser, R. H.  (1971). Displacement of auditors when clients go
public. Journal of Accountancy, 131, 55–58.
Cho, J., & Trent, A. (2006). Validity in qualitative research. Qualitative Research, 6(3),
319–340.
Chow, C. W.,  & Rice, S. J.  (1982). Qualified audit opinions and auditor switching.
Accounting Review, 326–335.
Cosserat, G., & Rodda, N.  (2009). Modern auditing. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Davidson, W.  N., Jiraporn, P.,  &  DaDalt, P. J.  (2004). Causes and consequences of audit
shopping: An analysis of opinions, earnings management and audit changes.
Quarterly Journal of Business &  Economics,  45(1–2), 69–87.
Defond, M.  L., & Francis, J. R. (2005). Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing:
A  Journal of Practice and Theory,  24, 5–30.
Firth, M.  (1999). Company takeover and the auditor choice decision. Journal of  Inter-
national Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,  8(2), 197–214.
Flint, D. (1988). Philosophy and Principles of auditing – an introduction. London: The
Macmillan Press Ltd.
Francis, R., & Krishnan, J.  (1999). Accounting accruals and auditor reporting conser-
vatism. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16, 135–165.
Francis, J. R., & Wilson, E. R. (1988). Auditor changes: A joint test of theories relating
to  agency costs and auditor differentiation. Accounting Review,  63(4), 663–682.
García, B., & Martínez, P. (2001). Comprenden los usuarios el informe de auditoria?
Tecnica Contable, 53(627), 177–194.
Gay, G. E., & Schelluch, P. (2006). Assurance provided by auditor’s reports on prospec-
tive  financial information: Implications for the expectation gap. Accounting and
Finance,  46, 653–676.
Gómez-Aguillar, N., & Ruiz Barbadillo, E. (2000). Un estudio empírico sobre la
relación entre informe de  auditoria y  cambio de auditor. Revita Espan˜ola de
Financiación y Contabilidad, XXIX(105), 705–741.
Gómez-Aguillar, N., & Ruiz Barbadillo, E. (2003). Do Spanish firms change auditor to
avoid  a  qualified audit report. International Journal of  Auditing, 7,  37–53.
Haskins, M.  E.,  & Willams, D. (1990). A contingent model of intra-big eight auditor
changes. Auditing: A Journal of  Practice and  Theory,  9(3), 55–74.
Heliodoro, P. (2014). A mudanc¸ a de auditor e  o relatório de auditoria financeiro (Tese
de  Doutoramento). Lisboa: Universidade Aberta.
Hope, O. K., &  Langli, J. C. (2010). Auditor independence in a private firm a  low
litigation risk setting. Accounting Review,  5(2), 573–605.
Hudaib, M.,  &  Cooke, T.  E. (2005). The  impact of management director changes and
financial distress on  audit qualification and auditor switching. Journal or Business
Finance & Accounting, 32,  1703–1739.
Ismail, S., Ali Ahmed, H. J., Md Nassir, A., & Abdul Hamid, M. A.  (2008). Why  Malaysian
second board companies switch auditors evidence of Bursa Malaysia. Interna-
tional Research Journal of  Finance and Economics, 13, 123–130.
Johnson, W.  B., &  Lys, T.  (1990). The market for audit services: Evidence from
voluntary and auditor changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics,  12,
281–308.
Kotler, P. (1996). Principles of  marketing.  Prentice Hall.
Lee, T.  (1996). Corporate audit theory. London: Chapman & Hall.
Lennox, C. (2000). Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence
from the UK. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29,  321–337.
López Combarros, J.  L. (1996). Propuestas para una  modificatión de la  ley de  auditoría
de  cuentas. Partida Doble, 71, 42–56.
McFadden, D. (1973). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In
Frontiers in econometrics. New York: Wiley.
McKeown, J., Mutchler, J., &  Hopwood, W.  (1991). Towards an explanation of auditor
failure to modify the audit opinions of bankrupt companies. Journal of Practice
and  Theory,  10(Suppl.), 1–13.
Newbold, P. (1997). Statistics for business and economics (4th ed., pp. 229–236).
Prentice Hall International Editions. ISBN: 0-1318554-9.
Ordem dos Revisores Oficias de Contas. (2001, Fevereiro). Diretriz de Revisão Audi-
toria 700 – Relatório de Revisão/Auditoria.
Palmrose, Z.  V. (1986). An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality.
Accounting Review,  63,  55–73.
Pasiouras, F., Gaganis, C., & Zopounidis, C. (2007). Multicriteria decision report
support methodologies for auditing reports in the UK. European Journal of Oper-
ational Research, 180(3), 1317–1330.
Patton, M.  Q.  (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (  (3rd ed.). Thousand
Oaks,  CA: Sage.
Petty, R.,  &  Cuganesan, S.  (1996). Auditor rotation: Framing the debate. Australian
Accountant,  (May), 40–41.
Porter, B., Simon, J., &  Hatherly, D. (2008). Principles of external auditing (3rd ed.).
England: Wiley.
Power, M. (1997). Audit society – Rituals of  verification. Oxford: University Press.
Ricchiute, D. (2002). Auditing and  assurance services (7th ed.). Chula Vista, CA: South-
Western College Pub.
Ruíz Barbadillo, Z. (1998). Dimensiones informativas y objetivos del informe de
auditoria. Revista de Contabilidad, 1(julidiciembre (2)), 120–152.
Saada, T.  (2000). Theorie de l’ information et Comptabilité. In Encyclopédie de Compt-
abilité.  Paris: Economica.
Schelluch, P., &  Gay, G. (2006). Assurance provided by  auditors’ reports non-
prospective financial information implications for the expectation gap.
Accounting and  Finance, 46, 653–676.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2000). Revision of the  commission’s
auditor independence file n◦ 57-13-00 (RIN.◦ 3235-AH91).
Senteney, D. L.,  Chen, Y., & Ashok, G. (2006). Predicting impending bankruptcy from
auditor qualified opinions and audit firm changes. Journal of  Applied Business
Research,  22(First Quarter (1)), 41–55.
Shank, J., &  Murdock, R. (1978). Comparability in the application of report-
ing standards: Some further evidence. The Accounting Review, 53,
824–835.
Siqueira, E. (2004). A importância, a Credibilidade e  a influencia do  Parecer da  Audi-
toria como ferramenta auxiliary na utilizac¸ ão das Demonstrac¸ ões Contábeis para
a tomada de decisão dos investidores: Um estudo eploratório (Dissertac¸ ão de
mestrado em ciências contábeis atuariais). São Paulo: Pontifícia Universidade
Católica de São Paulo.
Smith, D. (1986). Auditor, subject to opinions, disclaimers and auditor changes.
Auditing – A Journal of Practice and Theory,  6(fall), 95–108.
Warren, C. (1980). Uniformity of auditing standards: A replication. Journal of
Accounting Research, (Spring), 312–324.
Wiesner, W.  (1987). O  parecer de auditoria como instrumento de evidenciac¸ ão:  um
evidenciac¸ ão: um estudo de caso (Dissertac¸ ão de Mestrado). ISEC – Instituto
Superior de Ciências Contábeis – Fundac¸ ão Getúlio Vargas.
